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Among the technologies capable of harnessing renew-
able energy to meet growing world energy demand, 
concentrated solar power (CSP) is of particular interest. 
Its potential to store the sun’s energy as heat allows it to 
deliver power when it is needed to balance out gaps in 
supply and demand arising from the fluctuating supply 
provided by other renewables, helping to maintain a 
stable energy supply. Energy systems with high levels of 
fluctuating supply from renewables like wind and solar 
PV will increasingly need technologies that can play 
this balancing role. While other renewable technologies 
like hydropower or geothermal power can also deliver 
power on demand, the renewable sources they harness 
are limited. The power CSP could potentially generate 
dwarfs theirs:1 solar is by far the most abundant form of 
renewable energy worldwide.
Financing challenges for CSP in emerging 
economies like India
CSP has particular promise in emerging economies 
with abundant solar resources, such as India and South 
Africa. However, after more than 20 years of limited 
deployment experience, CSP investment and production 
costs are still high compared to other more established 
conventional and renewable energy technologies. For 
now, the technology requires deployment experience in 
order to reduce costs and risks and so CSP projects still 
need public interventions to be financially viable. This 
implies particular risks for project developers, such as 
regulatory change, the high sensitivity of project eco-
nomics to debt costs, and difficulties in securing enough 
investments. The public sector, on the other hand, faces 
the twin challenges of keeping costs for CSP deploy-
ment low and encouraging scale-up and replication.
Rajasthan Sun Technique CSP plant
Our analysis of the 100 Megawatt (MW) Rajasthan 
Sun Technique CSP plant in India indicates that, in this 
project, the public and private sector have addressed 
the financing challenges outlined above. As a result, 
the project developer is nearing completion of one of 
the most technologically innovative CSP plants world-
wide. As well as being the world’s largest CSP plant 
using linear Fresnel technology, the plant will also be 
one of the first completed under India’s National Solar 
Mission (NSM).  However, despite its ultimate success, 
1 See e.g. Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). 2011. “Special 
report on renewable energy sources and climate change mitigation 
(SRREN)”. Cambridge and New York: Cambridge University Press.
construction of the plant was delayed. This was true of 
many plants tendered in phase one of the NSM, which 
did not meet its deployment goals in the expected time. 
In addition, neither the Rajasthan plant nor the other 
large CSP plants in India planned to date include heat 
storage technology that would allow them to deliver 
power more reliably and on demand even after the sun 
has gone down. By outlining what worked and what 
did not this case study can inform the design of future 
policies and the investment of both domestic and inter-
national public finance programs to deploy CSP, such 
as the Climate Investment Funds (CIFs), one of the key 
public investors in CSP in emerging economies.
A combination of national policy, public 
co-financing, and private risk management 
enabled investment in the Rajasthan Sun 
Technique CSP plant
The Rajasthan Sun Technique CSP project has involved 
a range of key stakeholders: the Government of India 
set the policy framework, foreign development banks 
and an export credit agency provided debt, Reliance 
Power developed the project and provided equity, and 
finally Areva Solar provided the technology. Our anal-
ysis suggests that each project stakeholder played a 
particular role in addressing the major financing issues 
and thereby enabling the project:
 • The Government of India’s subsidized power 
purchase agreement (PPA) and payment 
security scheme were essential to ensuring 
the project’s financial viability. By awarding a 
subsidized Power Purchase Agreement (PPA) 
through a reverse auctioning scheme, the 
government covered the cost gap between 
conventional power and CSP technology. The 
government is backing this PPA in two ways: 
first, through public-ownership of the power 
off-taker, and second, by establishing a payment 
security scheme that insures developers against 
the default of the sub-national distribution 
companies that will buy the CSP plant’s elec-
tricity from the PPA off-taker. In this way, the 
government also reduces off-taker risks. 
 • Foreign development banks and an export 
credit agency provided debt with substan-
tially longer maturities than local financial 
institutions, making the project appealing to 
the local developer even at a very competi-
tive power tariff for CSP. This was true even 
Executive Summary
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though the costs of hedging foreign exchange 
risks cancelled out a large part of the benefits 
of foreign debt. The USD 280 million in long 
maturity foreign debt provided by the Asian 
Development Bank, FMO (Dutch development 
bank) and the US Export-Import Bank (US 
Ex-Im bank) won’t need to be paid back for up 
to 18 years - much longer than the 7-10 year 
maturities of local debt. It reduced financing 
risks and increased the internal rate of return 
of project equity by around 250 basis points 
(2.5%), helping the developer to implement 
the project at a very competitive tariff for 
CSP. While the foreign public debt has lower 
interest rates than local lenders, they did not 
lower the high costs of debt because of the 
cost of hedging currency risks. However, they 
did improve the project economics through the 
longer maturity of debt.
 • After the public sector PPA reduced the 
revenue risks and foreign public debt the 
financing risks, the private sector was able to 
manage the remaining risks, but not always 
at low costs. We find that the amount of risk 
taken by the private sector (developer and 
technology supplier) in this case is much 
higher than standard practice for similar 
projects in other countries. The project 
developer Reliance Power covered develop-
ment and non-hedgeable foreign exchange 
risks, while the technology provider Areva 
offered comprehensive warranties. These and 
other companies involved in projects under the 
NSM took on technology and foreign exchange 
risks among others, partly in order to establish 
themselves in a highly promising CSP market.
The following table summarizes how the project 
addresses the major issues of different stakeholders.
ACTOR BARRIER TO INVESTMENT PROJECT RESPONSES AND EFFECT
Government of India High cost of CSP
Subsidized PPAs  allocated through a reverse auc-
tioning scheme promote cost reductions; bundling 
of CSP with cheap publicly-owned coal power 
finances subsidized PPA
Government of India
CSP developers and investors do not trust PPAs 
with sub-national electricity distribution compa-
nies, as the latter are financially weak
The PPA counterpart under the NSM is financially 
stronger public entity at the national level than 
sub-national electricity distribution companies 
and an additional payment security scheme 
addresses the risk that the sub-national distribu-
tion companies buying the electricity may default
Developer (Reliance Power)
High investment costs and short-term orientation 
of Indian capital market
Debt with long maturity from development 
finance institutions and US Ex-Im bank; choice of 
Areva Solar as U.S. technology provider enables 
debt from US Ex-Im bank (the latter only lends to 
U.S. companies)
All investors
Debt from foreign institutions in USD-terms 
implies high foreign exchange (FX) risks as PPA 
and most investment costs are in local currency
Dynamic FX hedging for 60-80% of risks, remain-
ing risks are taken by Reliance Power with its 
strong balance sheet
All investors
(Areva)
Perceived high technology risks due to the 
innovative nature of Areva’s linear Fresnel in the 
country and the large scale of the plant
Developer secures comprehensive technology 
warrantee from Areva that mitigates perception 
and impact of technology risk
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While Indian national CSP policy resulted 
in low costs for the government, it has not 
deployed CSP at the planned scale and time 
horizon
In analyzing the broader aims of Indian national CSP 
policy, we find that, among the projects awarded, only 
those few with financially strong developers that were 
able to source public investment are on track to be 
completed. As a result we find that Indian CSP policy 
did not deliver fully on its objectives for installing CSP 
capacity, creating jobs, and increasing learning on CSP 
technology:
 • The Government of India awarded a subsidized 
PPA through a reverse auctioning system. 
Strong competition among project developers 
resulted in several bids submitted at prices 
much lower than the initial reference tariff and 
also lower than most CSP tariffs worldwide.  
Thus, the program met one important objective 
by delivering CSP power at lower costs for 
the government. The average tariff resulting 
from the auction process is 25% lower than the 
reference CSP tariff for the phase one of the 
NSM and also lower than tariffs in other major 
CSP markets such as Spain and South Africa.
 • Project delays, possible cancellations, and 
difficulties in sourcing technologies and 
financing indicate that the subsidized tariff 
alone was not sufficient to deploy CSP at the 
desired scale. There were several reasons for 
the delays: the low quality of the solar resource 
data made available before the closing of the 
auction resulted in winning bidders overes-
timating potential plants’ performance and 
returns. Additionally, the novelty of CSP within 
the country may have – in combination with 
the tight timeline for placing bids – led project 
developers to underestimate some of the costs 
and risks of CSP, particularly the sourcing of 
technology abroad and the establishment of a 
local supply chain. Lower-than-expected solar 
resource and higher costs, in turn, reduced 
margins so far that some winning bidders that 
have faced major financial and technological 
issues are now unlikely to build their plants. In 
fact, the case of CSP in India may be an example 
of the ‘winner’s curse’ phenomenon under 
auctioning schemes.2 This ‘winner’s curse’ can 
2 If a technology has not yet been deployed at scale in a country (as with 
CSP in India), costs and risks are uncertain. Winning bidders can substan-
tially underestimate costs and risks and be unable to build the plants.
partly explain the very low bids, but strategic 
first-mover behavior might have also been a 
reason for the low bids.
 • The only winning bidders able to build CSP 
plants at the low tariffs that resulted from 
the competitive bidding process were those 
that were financially strong and able to source 
public debt. The three (nearly) completed 
out of the seven CSP projects under the 
NSM (Godawari, Megha, and Rajasthan Sun 
Technique) are all backed by financially strong 
parent companies able to strategically invest in 
high risk projects with relatively low margins. 
These projects also all managed to source debt 
with relatively long tenors from public-owned 
banks, thereby improving their projects’ 
economics.
 • Implemented projects enabled learning on 
CSP, establishment of local supply chains  
and investment in basic infrastructure. This 
led to local benefits, such as job creation, and 
may reduce CSP technology costs both in India 
and abroad. In the case of the Rajasthan Sun 
Technique plant, both the technology provider 
and the local developer have learnt substantially 
from building their first CSP plant of this scale. 
The project developer also made longer term 
investments. The local content of the project’s 
investment value is estimated at 61-71% and 
included the establishment of a local supply 
chain, and the construction of water and elec-
tricity infrastructure. These investments created 
hundreds of local jobs many of which were 
high-paying, and should enable future plants 
to be built more quickly and cheaply. However, 
these learning and cost reductions benefits 
would have been higher had the original plan of 
500 MW CSP power installed by mid-2013 been 
achieved. Now only 150-200 MW are projected 
to be completed by mid-2014.
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Many elements of this project could be 
replicated and scaled up in India and 
elsewhere, but there is substantial room for 
improving the policy design and mobilizing 
local finance
Our findings suggest that this project offers valuable 
lessons to policymakers, international donors, and 
development finance institutions looking to scale up 
CSP in India and abroad. They are:
 • If a reverse auctioning scheme is used in India 
for future CSP programs, the design could be 
substantially improved. Given that this program 
led to some project implementation and that 
reverse auctions have been used successfully 
for CSP in other countries, we see no evidence 
to indicate that a reverse auction scheme for 
CSP could not be successful in India. However, 
improvements in the auctioning scheme can 
substantially increase the likelihood of project 
implementation. Our conversations with 
stakeholders identify potential improvements 
including stricter qualification requirements 
for bidders, setting out more realistic timelines 
for bidding, making better solar irradiation 
data available, and allowing sufficient time for 
construction and then enforcing penalties more 
strongly for delayed projects. Furthermore, 
in order to promote learning and future cost 
reductions in energy storage - a key advantage 
of CSP over other renewable energy technol-
ogies - future bidding rounds may need to 
provide incentives or separate windows for 
plants using energy storage. Incentives for 
storage are planned under phase two of the 
NSM.
 • The Rajasthan Sun Technique financing model 
combines debt from foreign public insti-
tutions with local private investment. This 
model could be replicated for other innovative 
projects, but, for scaling up CSP in India, more 
local financing has to be secured. International 
debt providers limit their exposure to specific 
sectors and countries, so local banks are needed 
for scaling up.3 More local debt financing could 
theoretically become available after local 
finance institutions become acquainted with 
3 For instance, we estimate that the most important development banks for 
India ADB and the World Bank Group would have to commit all their loans 
to the south Asian energy sector to India for 4-7 years in a row were they 
to provide all the debt needed for CSP under phase two of the solar mis-
sion (see section 6.3. for further information on how this was calculated).
the technology. However, policy makers have to 
address financing issues specific to the Indian 
context, such as short tenors and high costs of 
debt, which could be addressed with low-cost 
public loans. As long as foreign debt remains 
important for CSP in India, partial denomina-
tion of tariffs in foreign currency would reduce 
exchange rate risks.4 
International donors and development banks can 
accelerate national efforts to scale up CSP technology 
and reduce its costs by mobilizing local private invest-
ment, supporting the design of relevant policies, and 
covering part of the subsidies. Credit enhancement 
and building capacity at local banks would help them 
to increase financing to CSP. International expertise 
may improve the design of reverse auctioning schemes 
while the provision of financing with long tenors or at 
subsidized terms5 makes it more likely that CSP project 
developers can bid low and still implement their proj-
ects, thereby minimizing the cost to the public.
4 For more on challenges and solutions for financing renewable energies in 
India, see Nelson D, Shrimali G, Goel S, Konda C, Kumar R. 2012. “Meeting 
India’s Renewable Energy Targets: The Financing Challenge”, and Nelson 
D. Shrimali G. 2014. “Finance Mechanisms for Lowering the Cost of Renew-
able Energy in Rapidly Developing Countries”. San Francisco: Climate 
Policy Initiative.
5  By subsidized terms, we mean that public capital is lent at more favorable 
than the standard terms and interest rates of public finance institutions.
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1. Introduction
Among the technologies capable of harnessing renew-
able energy to meet growing world energy demand, 
concentrated solar power (CSP) is of particular inter-
est. Its ability to store the sun’s energy as heat allows 
it to deliver power when it is needed to balance out 
gaps in supply and demand arising from the fluctuating 
supply provided by other renewables, helping to main-
tain a stable energy supply. CSP has particular promise 
in emerging economies with abundant solar resources, 
such as India and South Africa.
However, CSP investment and production costs are high 
compared to other more established conventional and 
renewable energy technologies. For now, the technology 
requires deployment experience in order to reduce costs 
and risks and so CSP projects still require public inter-
ventions to be financially viable.
Investing in CSP, therefore, involves significant risks 
and challenges, both for project developers and the 
public sector. Private developers, on one side, have to 
consider potential technology failure, regulatory change, 
the sensitivity of project economics to debt costs and 
exchange rates. The public sector, on the other hand, 
faces the twin challenges of keeping costs low and 
finding the right tools for encouraging private invest-
ment in CSP deployment.
With this in mind, the Climate Investment Funds, one 
of the major public institutions investing in CSP, has 
charged Climate Policy Initiative with analyzing the 
effectiveness of different public financing approaches 
to promote CSP deployment and future scale-up.
In the background paper published as the first in the 
resulting series of Climate Policy Initiative reports on 
‘The Role of Public Finance in CSP’ (Stadelmann et al. 
2014), we identified key questions on the effectiveness 
of public finance in enabling CSP. They are:
 • Is public support needed in all cases? If not, in 
which cases is it needed?
 • How effective or cost-effective are different 
policy and public investment tools?
 • Can public policy and support drive technology 
cost reductions simply by enabling additional 
capacity, or are more specific interventions 
needed?
 • How can international public finance best 
support national policy efforts in emerging 
economies?
To answer these questions we will use a background 
paper, two case studies, and three stakeholder dia-
logues. A lessons learned paper and a policy brief will 
then distil the lessons.
This case study analyzes the Government of India’s 
policy of reverse auctioning subsidized power pur-
chase agreements (PPAs), the international non-subsi-
dized1 public financing, and private risk arrangements 
that stand behind the 100 Megawatt (MW) Rajasthan 
Sun Technique Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) plant. 
We selected this project as it is the largest CSP project 
worldwide using the promising Linear Fresnel technol-
ogy, and one of the most advanced and cost-effective 
plants under India’s ambitious National Solar Mission 
(NSM).
This report follows the methodology of San Giorgio 
Group case studies to systematically explore the role 
of project stakeholders, the investments and sources of 
return for the various stakeholders, the risks involved 
and arrangements to deal with them, and lessons on 
how to replicate and scale up best practice.
Section 2 provides an overview of the Rajasthan Sun 
Technique project, its main stakeholders and investors, 
and the policy environment in which it was developed.
Section 3 examines the investment costs and returns of 
the project as a whole.
Section 4 discusses the risk management framework, 
including risk allocation of the various technical, eco-
nomic and financial risks associated with the project.
Section 5 explores the effectiveness of the project in 
the short- and long-term, and also compared its costs, 
implementation speed, and potential for learning to 
similar CSP projects.
Section 6 examines the replication and scale-up poten-
tial of the project’s financing structure and likely routes 
to unblocking such potential.
Section 7 summarizes our key findings..
1 By non-subsidized terms, we mean that public capital is lent at the stan-
dard terms and interest rate of public finance institutions. In other words, 
no government grants are used to make the interest rate or tenor more 
favorable for the borrower.
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2.1 Project background
Project context: India’s power sector
India’s power generation capacity increased from just 
1.7 Gigawatts (GW) in 1950 to 186 GW by end of 2011 
driven by sustained economic development during the 
period (CEA, 2012). However, the country still has a 
power-deficit as power demand outstrips supply. Even 
though India added 55 GW of new power generation 
capacity during the 11th Five Year Plan (2007-12), the 
country experienced an overall power deficit of 8.7% 
during the period (Ministry of Finance, 2013) and is 
struggling to source more local coal and gas (Economic 
Times, 2011).
The Planning Commission of India estimates that 
the country needs to add as much as 75.7 GW of new 
power generation capacity during the 12th Plan (2012-
17) to achieve an annual GDP growth of 9% (Ministry 
of Finance, 2012). If this electricity were generated using 
the same share of coal as in the existing coal-dominated 
power mix in India, the additional capacity would gen-
erate additional emissions of 300 Million tonnes of CO2 
per year, representing a 17% increase of India’s total CO2 
emissions from fuel combustion in 2011 (IEA, 2014).
Enabling environment of the project: National 
solar power policies
The Government of India announced the National 
Action Plan on Climate Change (NAPCC) in 2008 to 
sustain its rapid economic growth while dealing with the 
threat of climate change. The NAPCC contains eight 
national missions that include solar power, energy 
efficiency, sustainable habitat, water, sustaining the 
Himalayan ecosystem, green India, sustainable agricul-
ture, and knowledge for climate change (Government of 
India, 2008).
The National Solar Mission (NSM)2 under the NAPCC 
was announced by the government in 2010 with a target 
2 Originally named Jawaharlal Nehru National Solar Mission (JNNSM)
to install 20 GW of grid-connected solar power capacity 
(including rooftop) by 2022 (MNRE, 2013). The primary 
objective of the NSM is to create a policy framework 
for promoting the diffusion of solar power technology 
across the country as quickly as possible.
The National Solar Mission is not only helping India to 
meet its international pledge to reduce CO2-intensity 
of its economy by 20-25% by 2020 compared with 
2005 levels (Ministry of Environment & Forests, 2010), 
it is also improving energy security and diversifying 
the energy supply of a country with limited fossil 
resources and rapidly growing electricity demand. 
India currently struggles to produce as much power 
from fossil fuels as planned: extraction of coal and gas 
in India is lower than expected, and the capacity of coal 
plants has been increasing more than domestic coal 
production in the last few years, leading to the need for 
more and costly coal imports (Economic Times, 2011, 
Sreenivas and Bhosale, 2013, Live Mint, 2014). Lower 
domestic coal production than expected, together with 
the high number of coal supply allocation to power sta-
tions (see Sreenivas and Bhosale, 2013), has led to the 
shelving and delay of many planned  coal power plants 
(Economic Times, 2012, Financial Express, 2012, expert 
interviews).
The solar power capacity installation target under the 
NSM is divided into three phases with specific target 
ranges for each phase (MNRE, 2009):
 • Phase 1:  1,000-2,000 MW by March 2013; 500 
MW awarded to CSP3
 • Phase 2:  4,000-10,000 MW by March 2017
 • Phase 3:  20,000 MW by March 2022
The targeted capacity in phase one of the NSM was 
split 50/50 between solar PV and CSP technologies. 
The main feature of its CSP policy was the reverse 
3 Only 470 of the 500 planned MW were awarded, as the winning bidders 
capacity totaled 470 MW, and adding another plant would have meant 
exceeding the 500 MW.
Concentrated Solar Power (CSP) has the potential to provide India with a clean domestic energy source 
that can improve energy security in a country with scarce fossil fuel resources, while also avoiding green-
house gas emissions.
The 100 MW Rajasthan Sun Technique CSP plant is highly innovative. It is the largest linear Fresnel CSP 
plant in the world, the first in India, and the largest CSP plant under construction in India.
2. Overview of project and policy context
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auctioning of subsidized PPAs (for all features of the 
NSM CSP policy, see Appendix A). However, the tar-
geted capacity in phase two favors solar PV more with 
a ratio of 70:30 (MNRE, 2012). The proposed preference 
of solar PV technology over CSP in phase two of the 
NSM is due to delays in the construction of CSP plants 
in phase one.4
While solar PV in India has also flourished under state 
level policies (particularly in Gujarat5), CSP in India has 
primarily been driven by the National Solar Mission. 
No plant with a capacity of more than 25 MW is under 
construction or has been commissioned outside the 
NSM framework (CSP World, 2013a) and recent state-
level auctioning of PPAs for CSP plants were unsuccess-
ful because of the specific design of the auctioning.6 
We list all Indian CSP projects tendered under phase 
one of NSM in Table 1.7
Enabling environment of the project: Solar 
energy policy at the state level (Rajasthan)
In addition to the subsidized PPAs offered by the NSM, 
the Rajasthan Sun Technique project also benefited 
from the Rajasthan Solar Energy Policy (RSEP) from 
2011, which reduced Value Added Tax (VAT) for solar 
4 The delays suggest there is a lack of data on implementation and opera-
tional issues, and make it more difficult for policy makers to set realistic 
conditions for a next auctioning round, when compared to solar PV.
5 According to ReSolve (2013), Gujarat state policy enabled 70% of the 
1000+ MW of Indian PV deployed between 2010 and 2012 
6 The auctioning in Karnataka did not attract CSP bids as CSP competed 
with the cheaper solar PV, while the one in Rajasthan (for 100 MW) has 
probably not attracted bids due to a combination of a low reference tariff, 
off-taker risks, and site restrictions.
7 In addition to the projects in Table 1, three concentrated solar power 
projects with a total capacity of 30 MW that were started under various 
state policies became part of the National Solar Mission (MNRE, 2012)
products from 14% to 4% and exempted solar project 
equipment from the entry tax (Makhija, 2012). The 
project also benefitted from leasing earmarked land at 
subsidized rates under the RSEP. The other measures 
under the RSEP – 33kV transmission lines for plants 
within 15 kilometers from the next substation – did not 
benefit the project, as developers built a dedicated 220 
kV transmission line for the plant.
Linear Fresnel: innovative CSP technology with 
high potential for local manufacturing
The Rajasthan Sun Technique plant is particularly 
interesting because it is one of the most advanced CSP 
plants under the NSM despite using a technology that 
has never been deployed at this scale. Not only is it 
among the largest projects under the National Solar 
Mission and the second most advanced in terms of 
planned commissioning, it is also the only one that uses 
the more innovative linear Fresnel instead of the more 
common parabolic trough technology (see Table 1 for 
technologies used).8
The choice of linear Fresnel enabled a high share of 
local content (61-71%) compared to other solar plants 
(see Appendix C for details): steel and concrete can be 
sourced in India, and the used linear Fresnel technology 
uses water and not imported synthetic oil or a specific 
salt as heat transfer fluid (as in the case of parabolic 
trough technology).9
8 According to stakeholder interviews, technology provider Areva Solar’s 
comprehensive warrantee was the main reason for selecting linear Fresnel. 
9 The flat mirrors for linear Fresnel are easier to manufacture in India than 
parabolic mirrors but the mirror supplier decided to only open a manu-
facturing plant in India, if demand further increases. Therefore, only the 
assembly of mirrors took place in the country (on site).
PROJECT DEVELOPER SIZE (MW) TECHNOLOGY STATE/ LOCATION STATUS
Lanco Solar 100 Parabolic trough Rajasthan Under construction, delayed
Rajasthan Sun Technique 100 Linear Fresnel Rajasthan
Under construction, to be commissioned in March 
2014
KSK Energy 100 Parabolic trough Rajasthan Under construction, delayed
Godawari 50 Parabolic trough Rajasthan Commissioned in June 2013
Aurum Renewables 20 Parabolic trough Gujarat Under construction, delayed
Corporate Ispat 50 Parabolic trough Rajasthan Under construction, delayed
Megha Engineering 50 Parabolic trough Andhra Pradesh
Under construction, likely to be commissioned in 
2014
Table 1: Concentrated solar power projects sanctioned in phase one (2010-2013) of the National Solar Mission in India
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2.3 Project stakeholders
The project involves a series of public and private 
stakeholders, each having a specific role in financing the 
CSP plant (see Table 2). Reliance ADA, a large Indian 
conglomerate, developed the project through its subsid-
iary Reliance Power, holds the full equity in the Special 
Purpose Vehicle and is responsible for engineering, 
procurement and construction (EPC) through Reliance 
Infrastructure, another Reliance ADA subsidiary (see 
Figure 2). A US-based subsidiary of a large French 
energy company (Areva) provides the Linear Fresnel 
technology and ensures operation and maintenance 
through an India subsidiary. The other key stakehold-
ers are two national public bodies (MNRE and NVVN) 
responsible for policies and power purchase, and a 
consortium of domestic private and international public 
investors, including FMO (Dutch Development Bank), 
Asian Development Bank and Export-Import Bank of the 
United States.
2.2 Project timeline
According to information at the end of January 2014, 
the Rajasthan Sun Technique plant will commission 
in early March 2014, around two years after financial 
closure. The implementation time of the plant is actu-
ally very short when compared with other CSP plants 
internationally (see chapter 5). 
None of the seven CSP projects granted a PPA under 
phase one in early 2011 (see Table 1)  met the initial 
commission deadline of May 2013, mainly due to lower 
than expected levels of solar irradiation at the project 
sites, financing and technology-sourcing challenges, and 
very ambitious timelines set by the government (NRDC/
CEEW, 2012; stakeholder interviews). As a result, the 
NSM extended the deadline for commissioning by 
almost one year to March 2014. Even so, the studied 
Rajasthan Sun Technique project is one of only two to 
three CSP projects that expect to meet this extended 
deadline. 
The project is planned to generate electricity for at least 
25 years (see Figure 1).
Figure 2: Project stakeholders for Rajasthan Sun Technique plant
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STAKEHOLDER DESCRIPTION PROJECT ROLE FINANCING ROLE
Government of 
India and public 
bodies
Government of India: 
the Ministry of New and 
Renewable Energy (MNRE) 
manages the National Solar Mission, 
under which 470 MW of CSP power 
plants received subsidized power 
purchase agreements (PPAs)
 • Issued guidelines for the project allocation and 
bidding process
 • Devised the blended power scheme, drafted the 
template power purchase agreement
 • Charges NVVN with 
awarding favorable 
PPAs to CSP plants
NTPC Vidyut Vyapar Nigam 
Ltd. (NVVN) is a power trader, owned 
by NTPC Ltd (NTPC), one of the largest 
utilities in India (75% government 
owned)
 • Invited bids for the development of 470 MW of 
CSP under the National Solar Mission
 • Power off-taker in the project
 • Pays favorable tariff 
to project, recovers 
cost by blending 
CSP with cheap coal 
power when selling it 
Project 
developer
Reliance Power Ltd. Is a 
developer in the Indian, electricity 
sector, founded in 2007, has more than 
30,000 MW of thermal power plants 
under development Majority owned by 
Reliance ADA, one of the largest Indian 
conglomerates
 • Develops project and provides 100% of equity 
for the Special Purpose Vehicle (SPV). 
 • Reliance Infrastructure (subsidiary of Reliance 
ADA) is the EPC contractor 
 • Provided INR 5500 
(around USD 105) 
million in equity
 • 100% owner of 
project Special 
Purpose Vehicle 
(SPV) 
Public debt 
providers
Asian Development Bank 
(ADB) is as regional development 
bank, owned by 67 governments (16% 
each by USA and Japan, 6% each 
Australia, China and India)
 • Provides non-subsidized debt 
 • Contributed USD 103 
million in senior debt 
to SPV
FMO is the Dutch development bank, 
51% owned by Dutch government, 
49%  by Dutch commercial banks, 
trade unions and other private-sector 
representatives 
 • Provides non-subsidized debt 
 • Contributed USD 90 
million in senior debt, 
15 million in subordi-
nated debt to SPV
Export Import bank of the 
United States (US Ex-Im 
Bank) is the official US export credit 
agency, part of the US government
 • Provides debt at a pre-defined rate 
 • Involvement made possible as Areva Solar is 
US-based technology provider
 • Contributed USD 80 
million in senior debt 
to SPV.
Commercial 
lender
Axis Bank is a major Indian Bank, 
publicly listed, minority owned by 
the government via the Specified 
Undertaking of the Unit Trust of India
 • Provides debt. Only private lender involved
 • Contributed INR 1140 
(around USD 22) 
million in senior debt 
to SPV
Technology 
provider
Areva Solar, is a US-based provider 
of Linear Fresnel CSP technology; 
subsidiary of Areva France S.A., a French 
publicly-owned multinational company, 
specializing in nuclear energy
 • Provides technology to project
 • Parent company Areva France is responsible for 
Operation & Maintenance, through its subsidiary 
Areva Renewable Energies India
 • Comprehensive tech-
nology warrantees  
Table 2: Rajasthan Sun Technique CSP project stakeholders’ description and financing role
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This section addresses two main San Giorgio Group 
methodological questions: what are the public and 
private financial inputs, and what are the main financial 
outcomes of the Rajasthan Sun Technique CSP plant? To 
assess the return profile of the project, we first consider 
the total project costs broken down across equity and 
debt contributors. Then, we estimate returns and profit-
ability at the overall project level and those accruing to 
each project contributor.10
3.1 Investments: who pays for what
The 100 MW Rajasthan Sun Technique CSP plant gath-
ered total financing of approximately USD 414 million. 
10 We attempt to quantify cost inputs, returns, and impacts that will derive 
from the investment to the extent possible using information about proj-
ect specifics if it is publically available, or industry standard assumptions if 
it is not.
Foreign investors provided for 70% of financing, a local 
Indian bank 5%, and the project developer 25% in equity 
contributions. Table 3 lists all investors and details the 
amounts provided by each.
Financing from foreign investors is denominated in USD 
and mostly in the form of senior debt with long-term 
maturities of 18 years.11 The Export-Import Bank of the 
United States (Ex-Im Bank of the U.S.) provided a loan 
tied to U.S. Treasury pricing, provided that the project 
purchase goods from U.S. exporters, in this case Areva 
Solar Inc. Conversely, the debt provided by the ADB and 
the FMO contained no subsidies. They provided loans 
11 The only exception is a subordinated loan provided by FMO when channel-
ing funds from the Interactive Climate Change Fund (“ICCF”), whose funds 
are provided by a group of 11 European Development Finance Institutions 
(FMO, 2012b).
3. Investment, return, and profitability
Public support provided through a competitively awarded power purchase agreement (PPA) was essen-
tial to ensure the financial viability of the plant
International development banks provided most of the financing at rates close to their cost of capital, 
without grants or subsidized terms used. The long maturity of their debt increased equity returns by 120 
basis points (1.2%) making the project appealing to local developers even at a very competitive tariff
Project returns seem below comparable projects in India suggesting the developer might be accepting 
lower profitability on the first project to acquire market share and a leading position for future projects
Hedging costs in particular almost double the financial charges of foreign debt, strongly reducing the 
appeal of the longer maturity debt it offers for the local borrower
SOURCE FINANCING TYPE AMOUNT AMOUNTIN USD SHARE
Debt
US Ex-Im Bank Export Credit Loan USD 80 80 19%
ADB Senior Loan USD 103 103 25%
FMO Senior Loan USD 90 90 22%
FMO Subordinated Loan USD 15 15 4%
Axis Bank Senior Loan INR 1,140 22 5%
Equity
Reliance Power Equity INR 5,500 104 25%
Total Project Cost 414
Source: ADB, 2012; US Ex-Im Bank, 2012; FMO, 2012; RPL, 2011.
Figures in INR are converted using the exchange rate at the time of the project financial closing, April 2012 (oanda.com)
Table 3: Rajasthan Sun Technique capital structure
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at rates consistent with the cost of capital for these 
Development Finance Institutions (DFIs).12
3.2 Project costs and sources of return
Using a discounted cash flow analysis (Varadarajan, 
2011) we model the project’s financial profile, in order to 
estimate revenues and liabilities, its profitability metrics 
and financial strength, and ultimately the levelized cost 
of the electricity generated (LCOE).13 Table 4 reports in 
detail the main results from the financial model while 
Figure 3 shows the composition of the project cash 
flows.
Cost breakdown
The overall project costs are comprised of capital 
expenditures, operation and maintenance costs, and 
financial charges.
 • Capital expenditures (CAPEX):14 The project’s 
capital costs amounted to USD 410 million. As 
with most CSP plants built in other regions, con-
struction costs accounted for the vast majority 
12 Interest rates have not been disclosed but we estimate that those applied 
by foreign investors are consistently lower than rates available in the 
Indian market.
13 By levelized cost, we mean the (present value of) total project costs 
for each kWh of energy generated by the solar plant. The levelized cost 
of energy actualizes all cash flows related to a specific energy source. 
Consistent with previous CPI reports, the calculation has been based on 
the expected after-tax internal rate of return of the project, based on 
anticipated cost and revenue estimates.
14 A detailed breakdown of CAPEX is not yet available; estimates are then 
based on information reported by project stakeholders.
(85%); while pre-development expenses, land 
acquisition, contingencies and financing during 
construction, accounted for the balance.  Within 
construction costs, the solar field (collectors, 
receivers, tracking systems and support 
structures) accounts for 70%, while the power 
block accounted for the balance (Areva, 2013a).15 
At the plant’s name-plate capacity (100 MW), 
the project unit capital costs are approximately 
USD 4,100/kW – one of the lowest amongst the 
CSP projects built in the last few years (IRENA, 
2012; Stadelmann et al. 2014).16
 • Operating expenditures (OPEX):17 We estimate 
operating expenditures are USD 26 per kW 
installed, with an annual escalation factor 
of 5.72% (CERC, 2010). On an annual basis, 
we estimate that the operation expenditures 
amount to approximately USD 5 million and 
represent less than 10% of the overall project’s 
LCOE.
 • Financial expenditures (FINEX):18 Overall, total 
15 The high impact of the solar field on CAPEX is also due to the decision to 
install a reserve capacity of 25 MW in order to increase the probability 
that the plant produces enough electricity to comply with the signed PPA, 
with the upside potential of selling excess power to a 3rd party off-taker.
16 Interestingly, if we consider the actual size of the solar field (125MW), 
technology unit costs are even lower at approximately USD 3,315/kW.
17 Operating expenditures are not yet available. The Central Electricity Reg-
ulatory Commission has provided some guidance to project developers in 
the request for proposals.
18 The remaining financing charges are confidential. Interest on the onshore 
Figure 3:  Rajasthan Sun Technique cash flows
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financial expenditures (FINEX) and hedging 
costs (net of tax rebates) on the debt facility 
should amount approximately to USD 200 
million over 18 years, and represent more than 
20% of the project’s levelized cost of electricity. 
Hedging costs, in particular, almost double the 
financial charges of the foreign debt, strongly 
reducing the appeal of its longer maturities for 
the local borrower (see Figure 3).
Expected generation and levelized cost of 
energy (LCOE) calculations
We compute the LCOE of the plant using current esti-
mates for costs and power generation levels19 and apply 
the project’s rate of return (after tax) as its discount 
rate20 (see Table 4 for details). This methodology allows 
loan is estimated using the India Prime Lending Rate for the last quarter 
of 2010 at 12.5% (CDM, 2012b). The interest on the foreign debt is derived 
through interviews with project stakeholders. Despite being much lower 
when quoted in dollar terms (ADB, 2013), it comes very close to the 
domestic debt when the cost of hedging is considered. Hedging costs are 
derived from the difference between the two countries interest rate curves 
and computed with Bloomberg Data Swap Manager.
19 An average equipment degradation of 0.72% per annum is taken into 
account (CDM, 2011a).
20 The discount rate in the LCOE calculations represents the “adequate” 
us to link the LCOE to the tariff ultimately quoted in the 
tender process – to assess the impact of the project 
financial structure on the cost of the electricity pro-
duced and, consequently, its price for the end user.
We estimate an LCOE of INR 12.5/kWh (USD 0.24/
kWh21) for the Rajasthan Sun Technique plant. This is 
roughly in line with the tariff awarded to the project, 
and confirms the plant as one of cheapest CSP proj-
ects built so far in the world (Frisari and Falconer 2013; 
Stadelmann et al. 2014).
Breaking down levelized costs, CAPEX represents two 
thirds of the total (70%), financing expenditures and 
hedging costs (FINEX) slightly less than one quarter 
(21%), and operation and maintenance costs (OPEX) 
close to 10% of the total value.
LCOE computations allow two very interesting insights:
 • Longer maturities of 10 years have allowed the 
project developers to reach their required rate 
remuneration of the financial resources committed to the project.
21 The LCOE value in USD is derived used the exchange rate at the time of 
project’s financial closing (INR/USD 52.6); however, as there’s no direct 
pass-through of foreign exchange in the tariff, the LCOE in today USD 
should reflect the devaluation of the Indian Rupee and be valued at less 
than USD 20/kWh.
ESTIMATED VALUES AT THE TIME 
OF BIDDING VALUE COMMENT
Annual Energy Generated 265 GWh
Annual power generated is estimated on the available capacity of 
125 MW in the solar field, a capacity utilization factor of 24% and an 
annual degradation factor of 0.72% p.a. 
Total Annual Revenues USD 60.5 million Annual revenues are almost entirely generated through the sale of 
power to NVVN at the tariff bid in phase one of the NSM. The tariff 
benefits from revenue support policy of the solar mission (roughly USD 
40 million p.a.). 
 - Power sold through PPA USD 59 million
 - Sale of carbon credits USD 1.5 million
Investment Costs
USD 410 million Investment costs are considerably lower than in the case of most CSP 
plants developed in both developed and emerging countries (IRENA, 
2012; Stadelmann et al. 2014). USD 4,100 /kW
Levelized Cost of Electricity 
(LCOE)
INR 12.5/kWh
LCOE is computed with the project IRR as the discount factor. CAPEX is 
the largest component, with the cost of financial charges and hedging 
also representing a significant portion of the value.  
USD 0.24/kWh
 - CAPEX 70%
 - OPEX 9%
 - FINEX 21%
Internal Rate of Return (IRR)
Project 11-12% Rate of returns are at the lower end of the spectrum reported by liter-
ature and below those expected by the Central Electricity Regulatory 
Commission (CERC, 2010).Equity 11-14%
Table 4: Rajasthan Sun Technique financial metrics
kWh = kilowatt hours, GWh = Gigawatt hours
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of return bidding a tariff roughly 4-5% lower 
than what would have been affordable with 
debt of 7 years maturity.22
 • Very high hedging costs due to the low liquidity 
in the currency swap market for long maturity 
debt weigh heavily on the LCOE (almost 10% of 
the total). We estimate that, if policymakers 
could lower these hedging costs to half,23 the 
project developers could achieve the same rate 
of return with a 7% lower tariff. In turn, such 
a lower tariff would reduce the plant’s viability 
gap24 from USD 42 million to roughly USD 37 
million per year.
Project’s sources of return
The main source of return for the project is the sale 
of power through the PPA signed with the govern-
ment-backed agency NVVN at the agreed tariff of 11.97 
INR/kWh (USD 0.23 per kWh). Assuming an average 
plant load factor of 24% (for 125 MW gross capacity), 
annual revenues from sales of electricity amount to 
USD 60.5 million. This value is more than three times 
the amount that a plant could realize on the market 
and ultimately makes the project financially viable.  
Consequently, we estimate the value of the revenue 
support policy at around USD 40 million per year. 
Without any revenue support, the developer would 
not achieve a positive IRR nor be able to repay debt by 
selling the power at the prevailing market prices for 
industrial usage (around INR 3.5/kWh).
Of much smaller relevance are the revenues expected 
to result from the sale of carbon credits, approximately 
USD 1.5 million per year and USD 14 million over the life 
of the project.25 Their impact on the project’s financial 
metrics is, therefore, negligible.
22 10 years is the longest maturity of reference for long-term debt in the 
Indian banking sector (Nelson et al, 2012), with more common values 
being 5-7 years.
23 For example, by offering a portion of the debt in local currency, by offering 
a portion of the revenues in hard currency (Nelson and Shrimali, 2014), or 
by a broader increase of liquidity in the currency swap market.
24 The plant’s viability gap is estimated as the difference between the tariff 
required by the developer to operate the plant and the average market 
price, multiplied by the power produced. 
25 The CDM Executive Board approved the project in July 2013 awarding it 
approximately 250,000 carbon credits each year for the next ten years. 
We have valued carbon credits at EUR 4.8/tCO2 using a transaction that 
occurred in November 2012 between a wind farm in Rajasthan and the 
Swedish Energy Agency as a benchmark (The Times of India, 2012).
3.3 Costs and benefits for project 
stakeholders
The project generates several financial and non-finan-
cial benefits that accrue to different stakeholders and, 
ultimately, justify their involvement. In fact, in order to 
be viable, the project needed substantial inputs from 
all stakeholders: support to revenues provided by the 
country’s national government, long term financing 
from DFIs that plugged a gap in the local capital market, 
and the equity and management resources that project 
developers made available.
Public Sector stakeholders
National and local government
Within the framework of the NSM, the Government of 
India’s support for the 470 MW of CSP projects seeks to 
achieve two main outcomes. First, to increase secu-
rity of energy supply by exploiting a domestic clean 
energy source while displacing fossil fuel sources whose 
domestic production is not keeping up with the increase 
in power plant capacity, leading to below capacity 
production and necessitating more expensive imports.26 
Second, to kick start the development of a local con-
centrated solar power industry in a similar way that it 
managed to do with the PV industry.
Once commissioned, the 100 MW project will gener-
ate 265 GWh of grid-based electricity per year, which 
equals the annual consumption of 400,000 Indian 
inhabitants in 2010. This clean electricity will replace 
coal, gas, and other fossil-based technologies, equaling 
approximately 266,000 tCO2e per year (CDM, 2011a),27 
or around 0.03% of Indian power sector emissions in 
2011 (IEA, 2013).
The local content requirements in the tender were 
designed to ensure that at least part (a minimum of 
30%) of the project value would be sourced in the 
country. We estimate that more than 60% of Rajasthan 
Sun Technique’s value has been sourced within the 
country (see Appendix C for details): infrastructure 
and project management work have been completely 
localized (also thanks to the already established oper-
ations of Reliance Infra as Engineering Procurement 
Construction (EPC) contractor), infrastructure material 
26 Issues concerning lack of coal and gas to run the country’s power plants 
started to surface in 2011 (Singh, 2011) and have worsened over the years 
as the cost of imports in local currency has skyrocketed (The Financial 
Express, 2013), helped by rupee’s weakness.
27 Based on total electricity consumption and number of inhabitants accord-
ing to the EIA (2013).
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(cement and steel) has been sourced locally, and the 
assembly of the solar receivers on site has prompted 
the training of a highly skilled workforce employed in 
tasks such as high precision construction and welding. 
In total, several hundred jobs have been created during 
construction and fewer are created during operation
The local content is one reason why the project will help 
the government to meet its goal to build up a com-
petitive solar industry in India: critical CSP knowledge 
and technology are transferred from US and European 
countries to India, local supply chains are established 
(e.g. for the steel support structure and parts of the 
receiver), basic land, water and electricity infrastructure 
for further CSP plants are established, and the involved 
local stakeholders learn on how to source, install, 
finance and operate CSP technology in India.
From a financial perspective, the national government 
allowed the project developers to enjoy the benefit of a 
much higher tariff than available on the market. It then 
combined this expensive solar power with a portion of 
the country’s coal power produced by public entities at 
very low costs. The resulting bundle was offered to state 
power distribution companies at the same price they 
would have paid in the market for their power needs.28 
This policy creates an incentive for distribution compa-
nies to purchase the solar power without it costing them 
anything more.
However, the policy has an opportunity cost due to the 
multi-year commitment of this publicly-owned coal 
power to support solar power. The estimation of this 
public cost proves very hard as the value of the public-
ly-owned coal power is highly dependent on the political 
decisions over its use.29 
Finally, the project will generate, on average, approxi-
mately INR 8,810 million (around USD 170 million) in tax 
revenues over the project’s life.
Foreign public lenders: Development Finance 
Institutions and export credit agency
The ADB, FMO, and US Ex-Im provided long-dated debt 
to the project, extending available maturities from 10 to 
18 years.30 We have estimated that the availability of this 
longer-term debt ultimately increases the rate of return 
for equity holders by roughly 100 basis points, improving 
28 The purchase of CSP power also helps utilities to comply with their 
Renewable Power Obligations (RPOs).
29 This “reserve” coal power is often provided to states or municipalities 
almost free of charge if they are facing fuel shortages, or used  to prevent 
outages and excessive load shedding.
30 This includes a one year moratorium.
the risk-return profile of the project developer. The debt 
was not provided at subsidized levels, and charged 
interest rates that represent the cost of funding for 
these international investors.
We estimate these international investors will collect 
approximately USD 148 million in interest rates pay-
ments over the project’s life. ADB and FMO financed 
the project in order to support the demonstration of the 
linear Fresnel CSP technology at utility scale, to help 
India exploit its indigenous renewable resources, to 
promote local manufacturing, and to reduce technology 
costs over time (ADB, 2012; FMO, 2012b). U.S. Ex-Im 
instead provided financing to the project in order to 
support the export of US technologies (Areva Solar Inc 
USA) (US Ex-Im, 2012).
The DFIs share the government’s goal of clean energy, 
local job creation and establishment of a local CSP 
industry. In addition, they are also interested in cost 
reductions and competitiveness of CSP technology 
worldwide. Such cost reductions can, indeed, be 
expected due to three reasons: first, as the project is the 
first of this size, all key stakeholders report substantial 
learning during the project development and construc-
tion, and the same should happen in the operation 
phase. Second, the establishment of a local supply chain 
reduces costs, and third, there are clear economies of 
scale, as future CSP plants in India will benefit from the 
water and electricity infrastructure built for this plant. 
Private Sector stakeholders
Project Developer: Reliance Power Limited
Reliance Power Limited (RPL) is the sole owner of the 
project company Rajasthan Sun Technique Energy 
Private Limited (RSTEPL) and funded it with USD 105 
million of equity. The project will generate net earn-
ings (after tax and debt payments) of USD 12 million 
per annum, on average, and USD 280 million over the 
project’s life. We estimate a rate of return for the equity 
holders of approximately 11-14%. This sits at the lower 
end of the range cited by the regulator (CERC, 2010) and 
during stakeholders’ interviews, but seems to suggest 
a first mover strategy, in which the developer accepts 
a lower profitability for the first project to make sure 
to acquire market share, to increase learning on devel-
oping and constructing CSP plants, and to establish a 
leading position for successive projects. RPL has already 
prepared a follow-up to this project by acquiring more 
land than needed for the first plant, and by introduc-
ing in the project design certain features that will be 
shared with the second phase of this project (mainly 
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civil constructions). At the same time, the commer-
cial agreement between RPL and Areva included the 
possibility of building two 125 MW Fresnel plants for the 
site (Areva, 2012b) from the beginning provided that the 
developer secures another PPA for the second plant on 
the site.
Technology Supplier: Areva Solar
Areva has supplied, delivered and installed the technol-
ogy for the solar field through a sub-EPC contract with 
the project main contractor Reliance Infrastructure. 
Areva assumed a significant amount of risk through 
this EPC as this was the first time their technology has 
been scaled up to such size.31 Furthermore, as one of the 
first concentrated solar power projects in the country, it 
faced a non-existent local supply chain for high preci-
sion infrastructure. Despite the high first-mover costs, 
the project was an interesting venture for Areva as it 
provided opportunities to learn, improve its technol-
ogy, and prove to developers that its technology can be 
deployed at utility scale. The agreement with Reliance 
for a second 125 MW solar plant (Areva 2012b) proves 
31 The largest plant developed by Areva before this project was of only 4 
MW capacity.
the long-term interest of the supplier for the Indian 
market.
Private Lender: Axis Bank
Axis Bank provided a small tranche of the debt facility 
but, interestingly, at 18 years maturity, indeed much 
longer than the one prevalent in the Indian banking 
market. This was likely due to the small size of the debt 
relative to the value of the project, and their existing 
business relationships with the project developer. We 
estimate that the bank will receive (in local currency) 
USD 26 million in interest payments over the lifetime of 
the debt.
 
Table 5 summarizes the key inputs and benefits for dif-
ferent stakeholders. Inputs are the ingredients to make 
the project happen. Benefits are classified as outputs 
(benefits during construction, which can already be 
measures), interim benefits (in the first years of oper-
ation) and outcomes (long-term or ultimate benefits 
during the lifetime of the plant). 
INPUT OUTPUT INTERIM BENEFITS OUTCOME
Private capital: USD 126 
million, of which USD 104 million 
equity (project developer) 
and 22 million from private 
lender
Installed CSP capacity: 
100 MW
(constructed in less than 
2 years), benefit for public 
stakeholders
Clean energy: 265 GWh per 
year of solar energy generation, 
benefit for public stakeholders
Support for meeting India’s  
solar, renewable energy and 
emission targets, benefit for 
national government 
Public capital: USD 288 
million (debt) from foreign 
public lenders
Several hundred jobs in 
manufacturing and construc-
tion created, benefit for public 
stakeholders
Greenhouse gas emis-
sion reduction: around 
266,000 tonnes of CO2 per year, 
benefit for public stakeholders
Taxes: INR 8,810 million corporate 
taxes over project life, benefit for 
national government
Public revenue support: 
>6 INR/kWh from national 
government
US exports and tech-
nology transfer to India 
benefit for all stakeholders
Jobs for operation & 
maintenance created, 
benefit for public stakeholders
Return on investment: 11-14% 
return on equity (project developer), 
and USD 148 million in interest rates 
payments for public and private 
lenders
Technology: warranties 
by technology supplier 
Learning during installation, 
benefit for all stakeholders 
Established local supply chain 
& infrastructure for further CSP 
plants, benefit for developer 
and technology supplier
Learning during operation, 
benefit for all stakeholders
Cost reduction in linear Fresnel 
CSP technology, benefit for all 
stakeholders
Table 5: Summary of stakeholders’ inputs to and benefits from the Rajasthan Sun Technique plant
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4.1 Risk identification and assessment
To ensure we capture all significant sources of project 
risk (non-material and very low probability risks are 
excluded from the analysis), we collected an exhaustive 
list of categorized risks that could affect the Rajasthan 
Sun Technique project before systematically assessing 
those risks according to two criteria: their probability of 
occurrence or frequency (from very low to very high) 
and their impact on the project’s financial and non-fi-
nancial objectives (again from very low to very high):
Low-risk events
Risk events with low probability of occurrence and low 
to medium impact:
Project failure to meet government and Development 
Financial Institutions (DFI) standards. The project’s 
development had to comply with two sets of standards: 
those set by the Government as a condition to eligibil-
ity for the tender process (mainly local content); and 
those set by DFIs for the operation of the plant. The risk 
of non-compliance was, however, rather low given the 
amount of local content expected to materialize for the 
technology (around 61-71% against a requirement of 
30%), the relatively low risks of negative social and envi-
ronmental impact in a CSP project and the due diligence 
on social and environmental impacts performed by the 
DFIs prior to approving the loans.
Moderate-risk events
Risk events with moderate-probability of occurrence, 
but medium-high impact:
Regulatory Change / Public budget overburden:  the 
project’s financial viability rests on several government 
interventions, mainly an above-market tariff but also 
several tax exemptions. A retroactive change or recall 
of the subsidized power tariff or the non-exemption 
from customs’ duties would significantly hurt project’s 
profitability and its ability to meet debt repayments (see 
Appendix B for details on project sensitivity on tariff’s 
changes). This risk (perceived by the developer) has a 
low or moderate probability of occurrence, as the gov-
ernment does not provide direct subsidies. 
Off-taker default: revenues depend almost entirely 
on the PPA signed with the government-owned power 
trading company, NVVN. As such, its default would 
have a significant impact on the project’s financial via-
bility. However, the probability of this default is very low 
given the government’s ownership of the company
Infrastructure risk / water availability: the significant 
water demand for steam generation and cooling makes 
the availability of water a critical risk. Water is sourced 
from a canal, approximately 140 km from the project 
site, through a pipeline built for three quarters by the 
Public Health and Engineering Department (PHED) of 
Rajasthan and for one quarter by the project company. 
The pipeline will serve both the plant (with 5% of its 
overall capacity) and the villages nearby. Provisions for 
temporary water shortages (storage ponds) are also 
in place. Given the delays in the construction of the 
pipeline (for the section under PHED responsibility), 
the need for maintenance, and the severe impact of a 
prolonged water shortage, this risk is categorized as 
moderate.
Failure to secure financing at reasonable costs: the 
risk of failing to source the capital needed, at a cost and 
maturity that allows the project developers to achieve 
their required rate of return, is a moderate to high, as 
the Indian capital market is short-term-oriented and 
not familiar with CSP technology. Furthermore, there 
is some evidence that, despite increasing in the more 
Central government backing for the subsidized PPA and foreign public investment was essential to 
reduce off-taker and financing risks
The private sector was able to manage the remaining risks, including technology and foreign exchange 
risks, but not always at low costs
The financial strength and appetite for risk of the private sector players involved may be very specific to 
this project. The public sector cannot expect that the private sector will always cover the risks of deploy-
ing immature technologies in countries like India and may need to step up its support.
4. Risk allocation
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recent past, non-recourse project finance32 is still a rel-
atively uncommon practice in the Indian banking sector 
(Nelson et al, 2012).
High-risk events
Risk events with high to very high impact whatever the 
probability of occurrence:
Cost overruns / delayed commissioning: the project 
is the first of its kind in the country and the first at this 
scale for the technology supplier, hence making timing 
and cost estimates highly uncertain. Construction and 
permission delays already prevented the plant from 
being delivered within the original expected 28 months 
commissioning period, and the project is now expected 
to be completed only slightly before the expiration of 
the 10 month extension granted by the Government.33 
The potential impact is very high as, provided the delay 
is not due to NVVN or to force majeure, the project 
developer can lose a portion or the full amount of the 
USD 6 million performance guarantees (NVVN, 2010b) 
and more importantly, can lose the right to sell the 
power at the tendered tariff.34
Technology risk: on commissioning the project will 
be the largest installation of linear Fresnel operating 
anywhere in the world.35 It is three times larger than 
the next largest installation and the first linear Fresnel 
plant in India. The risk of equipment malfunctioning, 
achieving lower than expected performance or higher 
system degradation, is high and would have a signif-
icant impact. We note here, however, that most the 
components of the linear Fresnel modules are simpler 
to manufacture and easier to acquire than those for 
parabolic trough and power tower, hence presenting a 
lower risk in terms of equipment acquisition and input 
cost variability.
Solar resource risk: at the time of bidding, no detailed 
track record of irradiation levels on the project site was 
32 In a non-recourse project finance loan, in case of default, the lender has re-
course only to the assets of the project and not to those of the promoters. 
Conversely, the borrower can only lose as much equity has been pledged 
to the project company (Nelson et al, 2012).
33 The PPA document states a 28 months construction period for concen-
trated solar power projects, starting on the date the PPA is signed. The 
Government of India granted all CSP plants under the Solar Mission an 
extension of 10 months, as no plant was commissioned on time.
34 A delay greater than 36 months is considered a cause of default and the 
PPA is terminated.
35 Before Rajasthan Sun Technique was commissioned, the largest utili-
ty-scale CSP plant using linear Fresnel technology was the 30MW Puerto 
Errado 2 in Spain, developed by Novatec Solar (http://www.novatecsolar.
com/56-1-PE-2.html
available, only interpolation from satellite data. On-site 
data was produced after the bidding closed. However, 
uncertain estimates of local weather events, soiling and 
dust may alter significantly the irradiation that actually 
hits the mirrors.36
Currency (FX) risk: As more than 90% of the project 
debt is in USD while revenues are denominated in INR, 
a deteriorating exchange rate would seriously affect the 
ability of the project to meets interest payments and 
repay its debt.37
Capacity shortfall (failure to reach expected clean 
power capacity): none of the developers awarded with 
projects in phase one of the solar mission had expe-
rience with developing CSP projects of this kind and 
scale, representing a significant risk that not all the 
470MW of solar power will be delivered on time.
4.2 Risk analysis, allocation, and response 
strategies
In the risk matrix below, we categorize the medium and 
high risk events identified above according to which of 
the three major phases (development, operation, and 
outcome) of a project lifecycle they occur in, identify 
their bearer and, eventually, map any risk transfer or 
mitigation that is put in place in the project financing 
structure. Risks are thus regrouped into:
Development risks cover all the risks incurred before 
the project begins to operate, including procurement 
(equipment / technology), construction, and financing.
Operation risks cover all the risks related to project 
output (production and availability risks), operating 
costs (notably operation & maintenance risk), and rev-
enues (power price but also all the regulatory and price 
risks relative to the associated benefits).
Outcome risks cover the risks more specific to over-
arching public policy objectives and strategic private 
investor objectives. They include the risk of not meeting 
renewable energy deployment and emissions reduction 
targets, the risk of overpaying for incentives, and the 
risk that growth and jobs co-benefits are not delivered.
The dynamic risk matrix in Figure 4 highlights two 
aspects of the risk management process: a) risk allo-
cation, how risks are borne and by which stakeholder 
36 At the time of writing, data collected on site following the PPA signing 
date have proved that initial estimates were approximately 10% too high. 
37 The Indian Rupee has indeed significantly depreciated since the signing of 
the PPA: by 12.5% at the time of the financial closing, to more than 25% at 
the time of writing (December 2013).
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at project initiation; b) risk response, how the overall 
risk profile shifts through the use of risk transfer 
instruments.
A close look to the risk allocation arrangements indi-
cates that the private sector carries the majority of 
risks in the project. The Government of India mitigates 
the level and uncertainty of revenues through the PPA 
and carries the risk of building a policy framework (e.g. 
the National Solar Mission) capable of delivering its 
economic, social, and environmental goals. The foreign 
public lenders carry the majority of the financing risks 
by providing the majority of debt. Once this is done, the 
project developer and its contractors are able to manage 
all risks internal to the project.
We focus here on the moderate and high-risk events 
identified earlier, deemed the most important for the 
project’s viability and its stakeholders’ decisions.
Construction delays, cost overruns, and technology 
failures: these are all risks internal to the project and 
better managed by the actor with the best information 
on their probability of occurrence and the best control 
over their impact. The transfer of all cost overruns and 
construction delay risks to the sub-contractors seems 
an effective risk allocation arrangement and is common 
Figure 4: Rajasthan Sun Technique dynamic risk matrix
in this type of project financing. Unique to this project 
is the willingness of the technology supplier to provide 
a comprehensive warrantee on the performance of the 
solar field. The warranty obliges Areva Solar38 to ensure 
the expected performance for the 
plant during the first five years, and, 
if this is not possible, to compensate 
the developer for the net present 
value of the revenue losses for the 
whole duration of the PPA. 
Revenue risk, off-taker and regu-
latory risk: revenue uncertainty for 
the investors has been completely 
mitigated by the fixed, above-market 
tariff stated in the PPA signed with 
NVVN. This risk has, however, been 
transformed into an off-taker default 
risk and, being tariff supported by 
a policy decision, into a regulatory 
risk. The off-taker default is mitigated 
implicitly by its government backing 
(through NTPC ownership) and con-
tractually by a letter of credit issued 
in favor of the project company, 
while a Collateral Agreement gives 
the project access to the receivables 
originated from the sale of power 
from NVVN to the states’ power dis-
tribution companies (NVVN, 2010b). 
Regulatory risk is mitigated by the 
bundling of solar power with the coal power from the 
solar reserve that, in fact, eliminates the need a direct 
subsidy from the budget and aligns the price paid by the 
electricity distribution companies to the market price.
Solar resource risk: The project has 25 MW of reserve 
capacity installed that could compensate for irradiation 
shortfall from the estimated values. However, the finan-
cial performance of the plant would deteriorate signifi-
cantly in case the power generated is lower than 90% of 
initial estimates39 (see Appendix B for details). 
Financing and currency risk: the risk of capital shortage 
(due to lack of long-term debt in the Indian financial 
market)40 has been mitigated through foreign debt. 
However, this debt denominated in USD has created 
38  There is no formal recourse to the parent company should Areva Solar 
default on its obligation but a bank guarantee has been pledged.*
39 The PPA also states financial penalties for any power shortfall below a 
minimum threshold.
40 This is also coupled with the tight sector lending limits for Indian banks 
that limit their lending capacity to the power sector (NRDC and CEEW, 
2012).
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a significant currency risk, further increased by the 
high volatility of the Indian rupee.41 Neither the project 
company nor its parent (Reliance Power) appear to be 
in a good position to manage such risk as the cost of the 
necessary hedging instruments (cross-currency swap, 
currency forward) is quite significant and completely 
erodes the benefit of the cheaper debt. At the time of 
writing, the project developer has opted for a partial 
hedging of the currency exposure that, on one side 
contains the cost of protection, on the other leaves the 
project partly exposed to the risk.42 
Capacity shortfall: to mitigate the risk of highly specu-
lative bids or non-committed developers, the gov-
ernment required successful bidders (hence Reliance 
Power as well) to provide a USD 6 million performance 
guarantee that would have been lost in case of project’s 
commissioning delayed for more than 3 months (NVVN, 
2010b).
41 The currency has showed almost a 10% annualized volatility (measured 
with standard deviation) since the PPA was signed (CPI elaborations on 
data from oanda.com)
42 However, Reliance Power is backing the project if financial health deteri-
orates significantly as a consequence of large devaluation, which has not 
been very uncommon in the Indian Rupee past history
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This section moves from a project to a policy focus and 
compares the effectiveness of the project’s financing 
and policy support model with other CSP plants in India 
and worldwide. We focus here on the effectiveness of 
the project in meeting the following policy goals: 
 • Quick deployment of clean energy at scale 
 • Low costs per MW installed and per electricity 
unit
 • Technological innovation, learning and estab-
lishment of a local CSP industry, to make CSP 
competitive in the medium to long term
The effectiveness assessment is preliminary as the plant 
is not yet operational, so electricity production and 
operation costs may differ from current estimates.
Comparing the project with other CSP plants in India, 
with other plants of its size, and other linear Fresnel 
plants worldwide, the Rajasthan Sun Technique project 
has effectively delivered several public finance and 
policy goals: providing clean energy in a short time (goal 
of the national government) potential cost reductions 
in CSP technology through pioneering technology and 
establishing local supply chains (goals of the national 
government, as well as international public actors, 
), and keeping costs of deployment low (goal of all 
stakeholders).
5.1 Effectiveness in speedy deployment
When compared with others internationally, the 
Rajasthan plant has been very quickly developed and 
installed: commissioning is planned for March 2014, 
which would be less than three and a half years after 
its award in late 2010 and less than two years after 
financial closure. Other linear Fresnel plants with a size 
of at least 30 MW (two projects in Spain and Australia) 
needed at least 1 year more for construction, and no 
CSP plant with a capacity of 100 MW or more achieved 
commissioning quicker, see BNEF (2013). Only one plant 
under the Indian Solar Mission was developed half a 
year quicker, the Godawari plant, but this plant is half 
the size (50 MW) and uses a more standard technology 
(parabolic trough).
It will be only the second CSP plant under the National 
Solar Mission to be commissioned. When looking at 
the reasons for deployment, a comparison of the project 
with other plants under the Nation Solar Mission in 
India (see Table 6) suggests that the subsidized PPAs 
offered in phase one of the NSM were not sufficient to 
deploy the Rajasthan Sun Technique or other CSP plants 
in India on their own. Only projects with a financially 
strong developer and public debt with longer tenors 
have been implemented or are under construction. 
There is uncertainty about whether other CSP plants 
will get built at all.
This supports our findings in sections 3 and 4 that 
both the long maturity debt from foreign lenders 
and the first-mover strategy of the financially strong 
developer were essential ingredients for the project. 
Other plants under the NSM without these ingredients 
struggled more with the challenges faced by all plants: 
the sourcing of technology proved to be more difficult 
and solar irradiation was lower than expected. This 
may also be an indication that bidders may not have 
been screened adequately (in terms of experience and 
Indian CSP policy delivered well on price but less well on deployment. By awarding subsidized PPAs 
through a reverse auctioning system, the Government of India was able to stimulate competition among 
private bidders, and drive down costs of CSP power to the public relative to other countries and its own 
reference tariff. However, the deployment targets of the CSP policy were not met, as ambitious time-
tables, overestimations of solar resources, and challenges of most developers to source financing and 
technology led to serious delays.
The subsidized PPAs were not enough on their own to achieve the desired level of deployment. 
Rajasthan Sun Technique and the only other projects under the NSM likely to be built needed both public 
financing with long tenors and financially strong private developers to move to completion. 
Lessons learnt during this innovative project, the establishment of a local supply chain for linear 
Fresnel technology, and investment in basic infrastructure locally mean the project should contribute to 
substantial cost reductions in this CSP technology both in India and abroad.
5. Effectiveness of Rajasthan Sun Technique in reaching policy goals
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financial backing) before being allowed to participate in 
the reverse auctioning scheme under the first phase of 
the NSM.
5.2 Effectiveness in keeping costs low
Compared to other CSP plants internationally, the 
Rajasthan Sun Technique plant, and the other CSP 
plants constructed under the National Solar Mission, 
have been deployed at low cost to the public both in 
terms of investment costs and electricity production 
costs. Our estimated investment costs for the Rajasthan 
Sun Technique plant of around 4,100 USD / MW (100 
MW name-plate capacity), or 3,315 USD / MW (125 
MW actual solar field capacity), are much lower than 
the costs estimated by BNEF (2013) for other linear 
Fresnel plants (>5800 USD / MW) and other large CSP 
plants worldwide (6400-10000 USD / MW). Similarly 
low investment costs can be observed for all Indian CSP 
plants that(3400-5000 USD / MW; 3500 USD / MW 
in case of the already commissioned Godawari plant). 
There are three reasons that can explain the low cost if 
Indian plants: First, the competitive bidding scheme that 
forced developers to look for cost reductions. Second, 
the lower cost of labor and manufacturing in India when 
compared to industrial countries. Third, the exclusion of 
storage, a typically expensive part of a CSP plant
The low electricity production costs are even more 
impressive. Rajasthan Sun Technique offered the fourth 
lowest out of 67 bids under the Indian Solar Mission 
(Emerging Ventures International, 2011), and the lowest 
of all plants that will certainly be commissioned (see 
Table 6).43 The 11.97 INR (or USD 0.23) per kWh it 
receives is also very low internationally; it is around one 
third lower than the past feed-in tariff of 0.27 EUR (or 
USD 0.36/kWh) per kWh in Spain (CSP Today, 2011) 
and also below the roughly 2.51 ZAR (or 0.31 USD/kWh)  
awarded to winning bidders in South Africa (Eberhard, 
2013).44 
At least two plants worldwide have slightly lower 
production costs according to our knowledge: the first 
is the 280 MW Solana plant in the USA that receives 
0.14 USD/kWh (CSP World, 2013c), and has produc-
tion costs of around 0.20 USD/kWh when considering 
the 30% tax credit or cash grant.45 The second is the 
43 It has to be noted that actual electricity production costs in India may be 
higher as the winning bids suggest; solar irradiation proved to be lower 
as expected, and the recently published electricity production of the 
commissioned Godawari plant shows a much lower capacity utilization 
factor (10%, see ReSolve, 2014) than planned under the NSM (16-25%, see 
NVVN, 2010b)
44  All USD values are based on the average midpoint exchange rates from 
Oanda.com for April 2012 date of financial closure, Rajasthan Sun Tech 
plant). The USD value for the ZAR 2.51 is taken from Eberhard (2013). 
45  It is not fully clear whether the plant receives cash grant or tax credits but 
the developer Abengoa made clear early on that the plant is not viable 
DEVELOPER SIZE (MW)
TARIFF 
(INR/KWH)
TECH-
NOLOGY*
DEVELOPER FINANCIAL 
STRENGTH / STABILITY
TECHNOLOGY 
WARRANTIES
DEBT 
(MAJORITY) STATUS
Godawari 50 12.20
Parabolic 
trough
Income of  INR 11 billion in 
2010/2011
Normal
Domestic, 
public
Commissioned in 
June 2013
Reliance 
Power
100 11.97
Linear 
Fresnel
Income of INR 28 billion in 
2011/2012*
Comprehensive Foreign, public 
Commissioning in 
March 2014
Megha 
En-gineering
50 11.31
Parabolic 
trough
Income of  INR 29 billion 
in 2010/2011
Unknown, likely 
normal
Domestic, 
public
Under construction 
Lanco Solar 100 10.49
Parabolic 
trough
Parent company under 
debt restructuring
Unknown, likely 
normal
Domestic, 
private
Delayed, may be 
cancelled
KVK Energy 100 11.20
Parabolic 
trough
Parent company under 
debt restructuring
Unknown, likely 
normal
Domestic, 
private
Delayed, may be 
cancelled
Corporate 
Ispat
50 12.24
Parabolic 
trough
Parent company under 
debt restructuring
Unknown, likely 
normal
Domestic, 
public
Delayed, may be 
cancelled
Aurum 
Re-newables
20 12.19
Parabolic 
trough**
Very small company
Unknown, likely 
normal
Domestic, 
public
Delayed, may be 
cancelled
Sources: Aurum Ventures, 2013, BNEF, 2013; D&B; 2011, Godawari, 2013; NRDC & CEEW, 2012; Times of India, 2013a, 2013b; expert interviews.
* None of the plants include technology to store heat for power production later on
** Strong parent company (Reliance ADA had USD 15.4 billion, or INR 950 billion of revenues in 2012).
*** NRDC and CEEW (2012) say ‘Linear Fresnel’, BNEF (2013), CSP World (2013b) and experts say ‘parabolic trough’.
Table 6: Status of large CSP plants in India (all under the National Solar Mission)
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160 MW Ouarzazate plant in Morocco  that receives 
USD 0.18 per kWh but this project is co-financed with 
substantial  finance at subsidized terms, so actual pro-
duction costs are higher, estimated at around 0.22 USD/
kWh(see Frisari and Falconer, 2013). It must be noted 
that these two plants with lower production costs than 
the Rajasthan plant have a higher capacity (160 and 280 
MW instead of 100 MW), so they benefit from econo-
mies of scale.
Why has the Rajasthan Sun Technique plant been 
comparatively cost-effective, particularly in terms of 
production costs? The use of reverse auctioning in India 
has led to competition among bidders, which may partly 
account for the lower cost for tax payers, particularly 
compared to the case of Spain which employed a fixed 
feed-in tariff.46 In addition, the long maturity debt from 
DFIs can explain lower costs compared to other CSP 
plants in India. The high share of local manufactured 
components in the plant, Areva’s interest in demon-
strating its technology and the strategic, risk-taking 
behavior of Reliance, also help explain why such a low 
price was offered. 
5.3 Effectiveness in technological 
innovation, learning, and establishing a 
local industry
The Rajasthan Sun Technique project may also be 
effective in making CSP technology more competitive 
over time for two main reasons: accelerated learn-
ing in the case of an innovative technology and local 
manufacturing. 
The Rajasthan plant breaks new ground. It is the 
world’s first linear Fresnel CSP plant with a capacity 
above 50 MW. It will also be the largest CSP plant 
in India. Linear Fresnel technology has never been 
deployed at this scale and had never been deployed 
in India before. Therefore, the potential for learning is 
much higher than when investing in more established 
technologies like parabolic trough or investing in more 
established CSP markets like Spain. Stakeholders 
confirmed that substantial learning has taken place in 
interviews. 
Secondly, linear Fresnel is quite a simple technology. 
Using flat rather than parabolic mirrors and simple 
steel pipes instead of complex absorber tubes, it has 
a high potential for local content, and therefore cost 
without this subsidy (Fehrenbacher, 2008).
46 The plant also benefist from a slightly higher solar irradtiation (DNI of 
2200 kWh/m2/year) compared to CSP plants in Spain (DNI of 2000-2100 
kWh/m2/year, see CSP Today, 2012)
reductions due to the low cost of qualified labor in the 
country. Indian content of the Reliance plant is 61-71% 
according to CPI estimates (see Appendix C), so con-
siderably higher than the 30% required under the NSM, 
slightly higher than the 40-65% in the Ouarzazate plant 
(Muirhead, 2013, Frisari and Falconer, 2013), and proba-
bly also higher than local content of most PV plants in 
emerging economies (except China). 47 Local content 
could even rise to 71-81% if mirrors are produced locally, 
which is expected from a capacity of 500 MW onwards, 
so cost reductions due to local manufacturing could be 
even higher. Local manufacturing is also an important 
goal for the Indian government, and it helps to improve 
competitiveness of the Indian solar industry.
One drawback in terms of technological innovation 
is that neither the Rajasthan Sun Technique plant 
nor any of the other projects under the Indian NSM 
includes technology for storing heat and therefore 
cannot deliver power on demand, a key advantage of 
CSP over other renewable energy technologies. The 
lack of storage is not just due to a lack of incentives 
for energy storage in phase one of the NSM but also 
because the lack of peak pricing at the national level 
in the Indian power market makes it less attractive for 
project developers to include it.48
47 In South Africa, local content of PV plants is assumed to be between 40-
50% although this is projected to raise (EScience Associates et al. 2013, 
pp. 129). In India, thin-film plants were exempted from any local content 
rules under the National Solar Mission, and have dominated the second 
bidding round (Johnson, 2013). If cells are imported, PV plants in India will 
at best achieve a local content of 58%, according to norm costs (CERC, 
2013) 
48 In South Africa, reverse auctioning without storage incentives (windows 1 
and 2) resulted in plants with storage but South Africa has a power market 
with an evening peak price.
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As shown in the previous chapters, the Rajasthan Sun 
Technique project’s quick and effective implemen-
tation relies on four elements in the financing struc-
ture: Subsidized PPAs with government-owned entity, 
awarded through a reverse auctioning scheme and 
backed by a government payment security scheme; 
international public finance with longer maturity than 
local debt, including debt from an export credit agency; 
experienced and financially strong private developers; 
and comprehensive technology warranties.
This section asks if this structure can be replicated 
in other geographies or used to scale up CSP in India 
where the government has advanced plans to support 
1-3 GW of CSP in phase two of the NSM.49 The next 
49 According to interviews, the responsible ministry plans to allocate 30% of 
the 4-10 GW solar power target under phase 2 of the NSM to CSP. Accord-
ing to the website of the responsible ministry, 2.7 GW of CSP are planned 
in phase two.
section discusses the potential for replication and 
scale-up, and how to overcome the main barriers.
6.1 Evidence for replication and scale-up 
potential
Use of the same project financing model in other con-
texts may be an indicator for replication and scale-up 
potential in emerging economies. At the time of writing, 
several elements of the Rajasthan Sun Technique project 
model have already been applied in other emerging 
economies and for other CSP technologies (see Table 7). 
Experience elsewhere suggests that the public foreign 
capital that dominates the Rajasthan financing model 
may be replaced by private capital in cases where a 
6. Replicability and scalability
If reverse auctioning is used to scale-up CSP in India in future, some design changes could improve the 
likelihood that successful bidders build the plants. 
The Rajasthan Sun Technique financing model that heavily relies on foreign public debt is replicable but 
more local private financing has to be secured for scaling up CSP in India.
International donors and development banks can accelerate scale up of CSP by supporting interested 
governments in policy design, taking on part of the costs, and demonstrating the feasibility of innovative 
technologies (including storage) to local investors.
NAME OF PLANT COUNTRY TECHNOLOGY FINANCING STRUCTURE MAIN PUBLIC POLICY
Rajasthan Sun Tech. India Linear Fresnel
Foreign public non-subsidized debt 
(majority)
Reverse auctioning
Godawari Parewar India Parabolic trough Local public, non-subsidized debt (100%) Reverse auctioning
Megha Engineering India Parabolic trough Local public, non-subsidized debt (100%) Reverse auctioning
KaXu Solar One South Africa Parabolic trough
Public-private (50-50)non- subsidized 
debt 
Reverse auctioning
Khi Solar One South Africa Power tower
Local and foreign public, non- subsidized 
debt 
Reverse auctioning
Bokport South Africa Parabolic trough
Private non-concessional debt (majority or 
100%, not fully clear)
Reverse auctioning
Ouarzazate 1 Morocco Parabolic trough Foreign public subsidized debt (100%) Competitive bidding
Shams
United Arab 
Emirates
Parabolic trough Private debt Competitive bidding
Table 7: Large CSP project in emerging economies using a similar financing structure as the studied project
Note: Plants under the NSM where completion is uncertain are not included.
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technology is already well-known (parabolic trough) 
and the financial market provides debt with long-
term tenors (South Africa, United Arab Emirates). A 
replacement of auctioning/bidding with feed-in tariffs 
is theoretically possible but has never been applied 
in emerging economies, probably due to fears of 
over-subsidization.
6.2 Overcoming barriers and realizing the 
scale-up potential in India
Three strategies may help to unlock the potential of 
the Rajasthan Sun Technique CSP financing structure 
in India, by overcoming the major political and financial 
barriers.
Well-designed and internationally supported 
national CSP policies
The scale up of CSP in India may be slowed by limited 
willingness to provide subsidies for renewable energies. 
Other countries’ experience suggests that issuance 
of subsidized tariffs for high-cost solar energy forms 
is restrained by the fiscal situation of a country (see 
Spain) or resistance of the energy consumers to pay 
higher bills (see Germany). In this regard, it will be 
important to keep costs for the public per installed CSP 
unit low.
To keep subsidies low, it seems promising to use either 
reverse auctioning, as in phase one of the NSM (see our 
analysis of the NSM’s low costs in section 5), or another 
competitive scheme to award subsidies, e.g. compet-
itive bidding for single CSP plants, which has led to 
lower electricity tariffs than expected in Morocco (see 
Frisari and Falconer, 2013). However, our analysis of the 
Rajasthan Sun Technique plant also clearly shows the 
shortcomings of the auctioning scheme under the NSM 
in terms of deployment and missing energy storage, so 
policy makers are advised to undertake the following 
two improvements:
 • Re-designing auctioning to improve the 
likelihood of project implementation. Under 
the first CSP bidding round in India, implemen-
tation of projects has been delayed. Only three 
out of seven plants are expected to be built (see 
section 5).The delays were linked to overesti-
mation of solar resources and underestimation 
of technology risks by bidders. The less delayed 
projects, including Rajasthan Sun Technique, 
were able to handle these risks due to finan-
cially strong private actors and long-tenor 
public debt (see section 5), but they were 
delayed as well. A re-design of the auctioning 
scheme could increase the likelihood that bids 
come from project developers that are finan-
cially strong and have access to long-tenor debt 
increasing the likelihood of project implemen-
tation. Interviews with developers and investors 
suggest the following additional improvements:  
more time for bidding and arranging financing 
(to allow for better cost estimations), stricter 
requirements for bidders in terms of financing 
and experience with CSP, allowing sufficient 
time for construction and then enforcing 
penalties more strongly for delayed projects, 
and better availability of solar irradiation data, 
particularly on-site measurement of direct irra-
diation over at least one year.50 
 • Incentivizing storage if there are benefits for 
the national power system. In the first round 
of bidding in India, none of the plants included 
storage (see section 5). However, storage is 
the key advantage of CSP over other renewable 
energy technologies (particularly solar PV 
power which is often cheaper than CSP), as 
it can help to bridge gaps in a power system 
dependent on more reliable and peak power 
supply (see Stadelmann et al. 2014).51 Therefore, 
it may be advisable to promote storage, 
either through a separate bidding window or 
incentives for storage in the standard auctioning 
process. Incentives for storage are planned 
under phase two of the NSM.
 • Bringing in international expertise to help 
improve the design of policies. The first round 
of reverse auctioning has shown that substantial 
room for improvement exists and international 
expertise is now sought for the next round of 
CSP bidding in India (see ADB, 2013b).
In the short to medium term, development finance 
institutions should step up their support to cover part 
of the viability gap to enlarge programs. International 
debt at subsidized terms or direct grants may incentiv-
ize India to increase support for CSP or other countries 
to set up new CSP programs. DFIs may feel that such 
50 In fact, the government has already invested in the construction of several 
weather stations scattered across the country’s territory to produce on-
site actual irradiation measurements, thereby mitigating the resource risk 
in phase two of the National Solar Mission.
51 India may both have an interest in both baseload and peak load power. 
In the case of baseload power, the country struggles to source enough 
domestic coal its main baseload power fuel (see introduction). In the 
case of peak load, there is a peak load demand-supply gap of up to 10% 
countrywide (CEA 2012).
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support is warranted due to the global economic and 
environmental benefits of CSP technology development 
and the need for stronger policy signals to build up a 
local CSP industry (as interviews with developers and 
investors suggest). 
Tools to hedge foreign exchange risks and 
stimulation of local private investment
From a financing perspective, a scale-up of CSP in 
India may face the problems of foreign exchange risks, 
limited availability of foreign debt from development 
finance institutions, and high costs / low availability 
of local commercial finance. The chances of financing 
similar plants will increase, if the following measures are 
undertaken: 
 • Assist hedging of foreign exchange (FX) 
risks. When using debt from international 
DFIs denominated in foreign currency, project 
developers face substantial foreign exchange 
risks that require hedging on the market which 
are costly, especially for long-term debt.  
Assistance for hedging FX risks will improve 
the likelihood of reaching financial closure and 
might also reduce the final tariff charged by the 
developer. National governments can address 
this risk by partially denominating power tariffs 
in hard currency (see Nelson and Shrimali, 
2014), and DFIs can do the same by lending in 
local currency.
 • Stimulating the switch to local financing. A 
similar share of foreign public debt would not 
be possible for all CSP projects in India, as 
DFIs limit their exposure to specific sectors 
and countries,52 and debt from export credit 
agencies is limited to projects using technology 
from specific countries. Therefore,  the sooner 
local banks increase their debt investment in 
CSP at acceptable terms the quicker CSP could 
be scaled up in India. However, local debt has 
high costs, compared to other countries (Nelson 
et al. 2012), and the appetite of local commercial 
banks to finance CSP in India is limited.53 The 
52 The World Bank and the ADB, the most prominent international financial 
institutions in India, invest around USD 1.1 billion in the energy sector of 
South Asia (Afghanistan, Bangladesh, Bhutan, India, Pakistan, Sri Lanka), 
see World Bank (2013) and ADB (2013c) . This means they would need 
to invest six years’ of all energy finance in South Asia in CSP in India, to 
finance the debt needs of the 2700 MW of CSP planned under phase two 
(2013-2017) of the National Solar Mission (SECI, 2014). Debt needs for the 
2700 MW are around USD 6.6 billion, assuming 70% debt share in project 
finance and investment costs of 3500 USD/MW. 
53 The involvement of Axis Bank as only local lender in the project seems 
national government could stimulate invest-
ments through low-cost debt (see Nelson and 
Shrimali, 2014). International actors can support 
the provision of local financing in several 
ways. For instance, by enabling the set-up of 
pilot projects to improve banks’ confidence in 
innovative and promising technological config-
urations (e.g. storage),54 building local banks’ 
knowledge of CSP technology, and providing 
them with credit enhancement to make them 
more comfortable with CSP investments.
Ensure scale and local manufacturing to 
enable learning and cost reductions
A substantial cost decrease in CSP technology will 
reduce several risks for scale up of the Rajasthan Sun 
Technique model, such as the need for high subsidies or 
high risk-taking by developers and technology providers. 
Policy makers can support cost decrease through:
 • Increasing the scale of CSP deployment. The 
more CSP plants are planned, installed and 
operated, the more technology providers, 
developers, and policy makers will learn and 
the costs of CSP will decrease. Increased 
scale also decreases costs through economies 
of scale related to infrastructure and local 
supply chains.55 While such cost decreases in 
CSP technology have not been observed on 
a global level, they are seen on a sub-tech-
nology and a country level (Stadelmann et al. 
2014), indicating that costs have already begun 
to come down as a consequence of larger 
deployment.
 • Promoting local manufacturing. One of the 
reasons for the success of the Rajasthan Sun 
Technique plant is the high percentage of local 
content. This has directly reduced project costs 
but also enabled knowledge transfer and local 
learning, which may lead to higher efficiency 
in the future. According to expert interviews, a 
scale up of linear Fresnel to 500 MW in India 
may secure local production of mirrors in 
to be more linked to existing institutional ties with Reliance Power than 
to appetite for the project; and the loan is also too limited in size to be 
decisive. 
54 ADB’s plan in India is capacity building and a combination of ADB and CTF 
debt finance to build two demonstration CSP plants with a capacity of 50 
MW each until 2017, see ADB (2013b).  Selection of technology remains 
underway in consultation with SECI and other stakeholders.
55 ESMAP (2013) projects a cost decrease of 8-14% for linear Fresnel from 
2010 to 2020, 11-19% in case of parabolic trough and 21-33% in case of 
central receiver plants.
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India, therefore, increasing certainty regarding 
long-term CSP policy support may be a 
promising way to promote more local manufac-
turing. The alternative solution – minimum local 
content requirements – has major drawbacks. 
It may lead to sub-optimal efficiency of plants, 
and contradicts the internal competition policies 
of DFIs which are important debt providers for 
CSP in the medium term.
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7. Conclusion
This paper is part of a larger project for the Climate 
Investment Funds that analyzes which forms of public 
finance and policies can enable the scale up of CSP as 
a promising but high-cost clean energy technology. 
CSP has not been deployed at the scale of other renew-
ables, and costs are still high. Therefore, more deploy-
ment experience is needed to increase learning and 
make the technology more competitive. The novelty and 
high cost of CSP implies a double challenge: the cost of 
public subsidies can be high, and private investors face 
substantial investment risks.
This case study focuses on the Rajasthan Sun Technique 
CSP project in India, as an example of an innovative CSP 
plant that enjoyed relatively quick and effective financ-
ing and construction at low cost to the public. 
According to our analysis, four elements enabled 
the plant. First, the subsidized PPA with a govern-
ment-owned entity closed most of the viability gap, and 
the government’s payment security scheme reduced 
the risks that the PPA price will not be paid. Second, 
international public debt had longer maturity than local 
debt and, thereby, improved the project economics and 
made the project attractive to the developer even at the 
very low PPA tariff. Third, the comprehensive warranties 
of the technology provider, who has a vital interest in 
demonstrating linear Fresnel CSP plant at utility scale, 
reduced the technology risk for both the developer and 
the investors. Finally, the experienced and financially 
strong private developer was willing and able to cover 
the remaining risks even though the project’s equity 
returns are not very attractive, because of its first-mover 
strategy to enter the Indian CSP market.
Under phase one of the National Solar Mission, costs 
for the public were comparatively low but the reverse 
auctioning scheme did not perform as expected in 
terms of deployment. None of the winning bidders 
implemented their plants on time, and only 2-3 plants 
with financially strong developers and public debt pro-
viders, including the analyzed Rajasthan Sun Technique 
plant, will meet the extended commissioning deadline. 
One potential explanation for this suboptimal deploy-
ment effectiveness is the ‘winner’s curse’. In the case of 
a technology like CSP that is not widely deployed, costs 
and risks are highly uncertain. Winning bidders may, 
therefore, be the ones that have substantially underesti-
mated costs and/or overestimated returns, leaving them 
unable to build the plants. The underestimation of tech-
nology sourcing challenges and the overestimation of 
solar resources are indicators for such a winner’s curse, 
but the case of the Rajasthan Sun Technique plant also 
shows that some winners may have simply bid very low 
due to a first-mover strategy.
If policymakers want to scale-up CSP in India or repli-
cate the project model in other countries, our analysis 
suggests the following policy recommendations on 
revenue support schemes and financing models:
 • If reverse auctioning is used for future scale-up 
of CSP in India, its design can be improved in 
order to increase the chances that winning 
bidders build plants. Better solar data at the 
time of bidding, increased time for submitting 
bids and construction plants, combined with 
enforcement of penalties if plants are not built 
on time, and strengthening of the requirements 
for participating in the bidding may help in this 
regard. National policymakers could consult 
international experts to help with the above. 
 • To stimulate innovation policy makers may need 
to provide incentives or special bidding windows 
for technological specifications that were not 
promoted under the first phase of the NSM. 
For example, if a country struggles to source 
evening (peak) and night-time (off-peak) power, 
it may be advisable to promote storage - a key 
advantage of CSP over other renewables.
 • In the long-term, scale up of CSP in the country 
will require a shift to domestic investments, as 
development bank and export credit financing 
is limited. Policy makers can stimulate this 
transition by providing low-cost local public 
debt (see Nelson et al. 2012), building capacity 
at private banks, using credit enhancement 
tools and setting up pilot projects for innovative 
technologies to improve investor confidence.
 • As long as local financial resources with long 
tenors are not yet sufficiently available and 
foreign capital, including DFI debt, remains 
important for technology development, policy 
makers should consider how to address foreign 
exchange risks. Policy makers can, for example, 
reduce foreign exchange risks by providing 
revenues partially in hard currency (see Nelson 
and Shrimali, 2014).
An upcoming SGG case study on a South African CSP 
plant will help analyze whether these policy recommen-
dations are valid beyond the Indian context. We will 
distill the lessons from this case study, the one in South 
Africa and a previous one in Morocco (Falconer and 
Frisari, 2012) in a lessons learned paper.
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FEATURE OBJECTIVE
Reverse auction/ competitive bidding
The auctions followed the pay-as-you-bid mechanism in allocating 
capacity to procure solar power in a cost-effective manner. 
Long-term PPA
All projects commissioned under phase one could get a 25-year PPA 
to provide long-term revenue certainty to solar power generators..
Guaranteed offtake
Phase one projects were guaranteed offtake from NVVN to provide 
offtake guarantee for the solar power generated. NVVN will act as an 
agent of Ministry of Power,.
Payment Security Scheme (PSS)
The PSS ensured financial closure of projects sanctioned under phase 
one to provide partial payment security for solar project developers 
in the case of default by state distribution utilities
Bundling of power
NVVN will re-sell the solar power procured to distribution utilities at 
a lower cost after bundling it with the available cheaper coal power 
to make the relatively expensive solar power affordable to distribu-
tion utilities. 
Note: Under the bundling mechanism, the designated agency for phase 1 projects – NVVN, will purchase solar power from 
developers (projects connected to the grid at 33kV and above) and sell it to distribution utilities after bundling with 
power from unallocated quota of NTPC coal stations at the rates notified by the CERC
9. Appendices 
Appendix A: Key features of National Solar Mission’s CSP policies
We measure the impact of moderate and high risks 
events by measuring the sensitivity of the project’s key 
financial metrics to the variation of certain projects 
inputs. We calculate here the impact of these uncertain 
inputs on the equity internal rate of return (EIRR), as a 
measure of the project’s attractiveness for the equity 
holder, and the debt service coverage ratio (DSCR)1 
as a measure of the project’s ability to meet its debt 
payments. We compare the resulting “tilted” metrics 
with the yield of the 10 year Indian Government bond as 
a measure of risk-free investment (8% in January 2011 
when PPA was signed) (TradingEconomics, 2013), and 
with the minimum threshold of 1 for the DSRC (below 
that value the project would fail to meet its payments).
Revenues risk: The PPA with NVVN locks the tariff 
at INR 11.97/kWh for the entire life of the project (25 
years). However, significant delays on the commission-
ing of the plant can trigger a renegotiation of the tariff 
(NVVN, 2010), reducing the price advantage of the solar 
thermal plants.
Solar irradiation risk: Data has already proven to be 
very uncertain compared to initial satellite estimates.  
Though the 25MW of reserve solar capacity installed 
should compensate this uncertainty, we here model the 
impact of further reductions, possibly due to “excep-
tional” weather regimes.
Our simulations show that with a 10% reduction of the 
tariff or of the power generated the attractiveness of the 
project for the developer is greatly reduced but interest 
payments are still met. At 20% reduction of the tariff 
(INR 9.5 /kWh) or of the power generated, the project 
has no longer any investment appeal (being much 
1 Debt service coverage ratio measures the ability of a project to meet its 
periodic debt repayments with the free cash flows generated during the 
regular operation of the asset.
lower than the risk free rate), and just meets its debt 
repayments.
FX Risk: Scenario analysis applied to different possible 
currency devaluation levels yields an interesting obser-
vation: the cost of the currency hedging on project’s 
profitability is so significant that the hedging strategy 
(partial or full) is the one with the highest payoff only if 
a currency devaluation greater than 50% is expected. 
Table B1: Sensitivity test of project’s financial performance to different levels of revenues
TARIFF CHANGES REFERENCE -10% -20%
Equity IRR 12.1% 8.1% 4.3%
DSCR  1.20  1.06  0.93 
Source: CPI elaborations
Table B2: Sensitivity test of project’s financial performance to different levels of power generation
GENERATION SHORTFALL REFERENCE -10% -20%
Equity IRR 12.14% 8.20% 4.43%
DSCR  1.20  1.06  0.93 
Source: CPI elaborations
EQUITY IRR 
(BEFORE TAX) NO HEDGING 60% HEDGING
FULL 
HEDGING
no change 18.2% 12.1% 8.7%
10% 16.1% 11.4% 8.7%
20% 14.1% 10.7% 8.7%
30% 12.2% 10.0% 8.7%
50% 8.8% 8.8% 8.7%
100% 2.7% 5.9% 8.7%
Appendix B: Risk Analysis Sensitivity Tables
ELEMENT % OF PROJECT VALUE SOURCING
% OF LOCAL 
VALUE
Solar field 70% India/Import 46-56%
    Solar collection system 52% India/Import 39%
    Support structures 23% India 23%
    Assembly & facility 9% India 9%
    Foundations 3% India 3%
    Land leveling 5% India 5%
    Drive Mechanisms 3% Import 0%
    Mirrors 10% Import 0%
    Thermal Conversion System 19% Import/India 7-17%
    Receiver Tubes 14% Import/India 2-12%
    Piping, valves, spare parts 3% India 3%
    Natural gas boilers 2% India 2%
Thermal storage 0% n/a 0%
Electrical Conversion System 30% Import/India 15%
    Steam turbine 15% Import 0%
    Civil work 4% India 4%
    Balance of Plant 10% India 10%
Total 100% India / import 61-71%
Source: ESMAP, 2013; expert interviews
Appendix C: Estimation of local content of Rajasthan Sun Technique CSP 
plant
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